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Brazil has the largest tropical rainforests in the world and most of them are located in the Amazon River 
basin area. During the last three decades, deforestation is growing very fast in this region, and negative 
impacts at local and global weather are arising. In order to minimize these impacts and protect a share of 
the biodiversity, Brazilian government has established several national forests in this area, but just one has 
being exploited, the Tapajós National Forest, also known as Flona Tapajós. This paper evaluates the 
economic and social features of a reduced impact logging project conducted at Flona Tapajós from 1999 
to 2003. It was coordinated by IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural 
Resources), funded by ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization) and implemented by Treviso 
Agropecuária Ltda (a private forest harvesting company). This project is locally known as ITTO project. 
Based on field interviews and through the examination of IBAMA´s and Treviso´s reports, this paper 
concludes that the ITTO project was highly profitable for the private company, even after attending all 
Brazilian working laws, what is not very common in this Brazilian region. Treviso´s internal rate of return 
was 35.79%, what is very high in comparison with crop and cattle projects conducted in the same region. 
ITTO project impacted significantly the community workers involved with the project and it was able to 
teach this population how to manage rainforests in order to produce timber without destroying the forest. 
The paper ends by suggesting some attitudes that Brazilian government can follow during its discussion 
about new reduced impact logging projects to be implemented at Flona Tapajós and other national forests 
by both private enterprises and local communities. 
 




In 2000, Brazil contained 527 million hectares of native tropical forest, equivalent to 
29.4% of world’s total (COFO, 2001). Most of these forests are located in the Amazon River 
basin and they are suffering an increasing process of destruction, shocking national and 
international communities. During the last ten years, 205 million square kilometers have been 
deforested, an area equivalent to ten times the size of Belgium. 
Federal government has tried, and has clearly failed, to curb deforestation in Brazil, 
creating conservation units, banning agricultural activities in a share of private farms and 
                                                 
1  Paper prepared for the 45
th Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA2005), to be 
held at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands, August 23
rd to 27
th, 2005. 
2 Professor at University of São Paulo and researcher funded by CNPq (National Council for Scientific 
and Technological Development) - Brazil. E-mail: cjcbacha@esalq.usp.br. 
3  Professor at University of São Paulo and researcher funded by CNPq (National Council for Scientific 
and Technological Development) - Brazil. E-mail: lcer@esalq.usp.br.   2
imposing official approval for any type of clear cuts. These measures have failed due to several 
reasons. Among them we can highlight the scarcity of successful experiences in exploiting native 
forests without destroying them, especially inside conservation units.  
One of these experiences took place at the Tapajós National Forest from 1999 to 2003. 
This conservation unit is known as Flona Tapajós and it covers almost 600 thousand hectares in 
western part of the state of Pará (see Figure 1). This state is suffering a fast process of 
deforestation caused by agricultural production expansion and unsustainable forest exploitation. 
Flona Tapajós is located inside a critical area where conflicts between environmentalists, on one 
hand, and illegal roundwood extractors and commercial farmers, on other hand, appeal frequently 
in the media. 
 
Figure 1: Brazil, the state of Pará and Tapajós National Forest location. 
 
Flona Tapajós is edged on its western side by the Tapajós River and on its eastern side by 
Federal highway BR163, which interconnects the city of Santarém in state of Pará with Cuiabá 
(the capital of state of Mato Grosso). On both side of this partly paved highway, cattle and crops 
are growing rapidly, especially soybeans plantations. They are causing deforestation and the 
latter will increase if BR163 gets totally paved (Alencar et al, 2004). Hence, Flona Tapajós has an 
important role to protect biodiversity in this Amazonian area.   3
Flona Tapajós is one among 37 Amazon River Basin’s national forests. Despite this 
conservation unit answers for only 3.41% of total Amazonian national forest area, it was the 
unique national forest that was exploited using reduced impact logging techniques. This project 
became locally known as ITTO project. 
ITTO project is officially denominated Project 68/89 Rev.1 (F) – Management of the 
Tapajos National Forest for Sustainable Production of Industrial Timber. It was approved by the 
International Timber Tropical Organization (ITTO), and funded by the United Kingdom 
Department of International Development (DFID), in collaboration with IBAMA (Brazilian 
Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources), to develop a realistic reduced 
impact logging experience in a large tropical national forest in Brazil. The concession contract 
was signed on December 4
th  1998 and, one year later, Empresa Agropecuária Treviso Ltda 
started harvesting a 3,130 hectare track of land inside the Tapajos National Forest. That area was 
subdivided in 38 working units, most of them sizing 100 hectares each. The extracted total 
volume was 63,392 m
3 (averaging 6.4 m
3/tree and 20.25 m
3/ha). Harvested trees were classified 
into three classes: high value (I), medium value (II) and low value (III) classes. 
Reduced impact logging techniques (RIL) have been prescribed to the Flona Tapajós as 
the alternative to conventional wood extraction operations used in areas outside the National 
Forest. Two experiences coordinated by Tropical Forest Foundation (FFT), a non governmental 
organization specialized in RIL, were initially implemented in the Tapajós National Forest. One 
was conducted in 1986 in 100 ha and another was developed in 1997 in 105.66 hectares, both 
were undertaken by FFT and Empresa Agropecuária Treviso Ltda. These experiences contributed 
with modifications to the ITTO project implemented from 1999 to 2003.  
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate economic and social features of the ITTO project. 
By concluding this task, we hope to come up with some suggestions for other reduced impact 
logging projects that can be executed in the same national forest or in other Amazonian national 
forests.  
  This paper is organized in five sections, including this introduction. Section 2 describes 
Flona Tapajós, giving some information about its origin and actual problems. Section 3 
comments briefly the scarcity literature about Flona Tapajós and reduced impact logging (RIL) at 
Amazonian tropical forests. Section 4 explains the methodology used in this paper to evaluate 
economic and social impacts of the ITTO project. Section 5 and 6 show up, respectively,   4
economic and social features of the ITTO project and, finally, section 7 brings out some 
conclusions and suggestions for other RIL projects in the Amazon River Basin. 
 
2 – Region under study 
Flona Tapajós was established on December 19
th, 1974, by Federal Decree 73,684. It was 
created when “occupying the Amazonian Region” was one of the political objectives adopted by 
military governments ruling Brazil during the 1970s. The approach was two folded: colonization 
with road building and settlers being attracted to occupy lots on both sides of the road. A few 
conservation units were established close to these roads and settlement projects. It was the case of 
Flona Tapajós. 
The opening of the BR163 road started in 1973 and finished in 1976. From kilometers 51 
to 211 of BR163, there were lands, on both sides of the road, which were under the custody of the 
federal and state governments. Tapajós National Forest was delimited as part of these lands. The 
eventual existence of dwellers inside the forest or in river side banks was completely disregarded. 
Governmental agencies also mishandled issues and competences, simultaneously creating a 
conservation unit in land close to the new road and in some share allocated by INCRA (National 
Institute for Settlement and Agrarian Reform), another governmental agency, for settlement 
projects. This conduct created two big problems for Flona Tapajós since its creation: inhabitants 
living inside the conservation units and settlers converting forest into crops and pasture. 
Until 1830, native indigenous population dwelled inside the actual Flona Tapajós area and 
since then new non-indigenous groups have moved into the area. These early inhabitants have 
occupied the margins of the Tapajós River for almost two centuries and they have now required 
their right over the land. Setters have multiplied on the eastern edge of Flona Tapajós and some 
of them have legal deeds to prove their land ownerships.  
Table 1 shows the population that was living inside Flona Tapajós in 2003. Tapajós 
National Forest is the home for 25 communities, 20 on the western banks of the Tapajós River 
and 5 on the eastern shoulders of the BR163 road. In 2003, these communities congregated a 
minimum of 876 families (5,102 individuals). There is also the municipality of Aveiro with 5,000 
residents living inside the limits of the Tapajós National Forest. The city of Aveiro sprawls over 
the two sides of the Tapajós River. One side is part of the National Forest and that is where 5,000   5
residents live in. The other 15,000 residents live in other parts of the villages located across the 
Tapajós River. 
 
Table 1: Villages and inhabitants living inside Flona Tapajós in the year 2003. 
  Communities  Number of families  Number of inhabitants 
São Domingos  36  190 
Maguari 52  230 
Jamaraquá 19  76 
Acaratinga 21  78 
Jaguarari 22  110 
Pedreira 49  260 
Piquiatuba 70  370 
Marituba n.a.  n.a. 
Bragança n.a.  n.a. 
Marai 18  100 
Nazaré 38  200 
Tauari 57  300 
Pini 30  150 
Takuara n.a.  n.a. 
Prainha 38  266 
Prainha II  15  112 
Itapaiúna 36  176 
Paraíso 12  72 





Itapuama 13  78 
São Jorge  208  1,500 
Chibé  42 a 43  350 
Nossa S
ra de Nazaré  24  144 




Santa Clara  39  175 
Total 876  5,102 
Source: Faria et al (2003, p. 7 e 9)                 Note: n.a. data not available 
 
From 1973 to 1993, Federal environmental agencies tried unsuccessfully to expel 
“intruders” from the Tapajós National Forest, causing some conflicts. These conflicts started to 
come to an end only in 1994, when a federal decree allowed the federal manager of the National 
Forests (IBAMA) to authorize traditional populations to live inside the borders of any National 
Forest. Since then, IBAMA has worked with communities living in the banks of the Tapajós 
River as traditional inhabitants. They are called “ribeirinhos” (people who live near the river) and 
have lived as peasants, integrated with the forest. However, communities living on the edge of 
BR167 road are commercial farmers (known as “colonos”), most of them originally migrants 
from Southern Brazil, and little integrated with the forest. As an example, “ribeirinhos” plant   6
rice, beans, corn, cassava and pumpkin mainly for their own consumption and sell in the market 
only cassava flour. Animal protein consumption comes from fishing and hunting local fauna. 
“Ribeirinhos” have their own code of conduct in relation to land distribution and they are 
supervised by IBAMA. Settlers´ farms range from 0.25 to 170 hectares, and they graze cattle and 
plant coffee and pepper trees, converting large tracks of native forest into agricultural plots. By 
doing it, settlers have had conflictive relationship with IBAMA. Easier land connection to other 
places provided by BR163 highway made “colonos” more market-oriented. 
 
3) Review of Literature 
  Very little we know about conservation units in the Amazon River Basin. Andrioli (2003) 
made an overview of all conservation units created in Brazil, showing the largest share of 
conservation unit areas are located in the Amazon River Basin. 
  Among the 37 Amazonian National Forests, only Flona Tapajós has been analyzed about 
its population, fauna and flora. Faria (2003) and Soares (2004) describe this area, its population 
and problems, but they do not analyze the ITTO project.  
Flona Tapajós was also divided by Federal Government in nine zones (IBAMA, 1999). 
One of them recognizes “ribeirinhos” and “colonos” rights over their lands and 191 thousand 
hectare zone 2 was allocated only for RIL projects. ITTO project took place in this zone 2, using 
1.64% of total available area for RIL projects. On the right side of map 1, ITTO project area 
appeared in red color. 
  Reduced impact logging (RIL) is scarcely analyzed in the Amazon River Basin. Only two 
papers present evaluations of private tracks of rainforests (Barreto et al, 1998; and Homes et al, 
2002). Both show RIL projects are profitable. 
  This paper adds some information up this knowledge, analyzing economic and social 
impacts of a RIL conducted at Flona Tapajós, what is ITTO project. 
 
4) Methodology 
  This paper bases on primary dataset collected at ITTO project area between May 27
th and 
June 02
nd, 2004, and also relies on private and public reports about Tapajós National Forest area 
and ITTO project.   7
  In order to evaluate ITTO project’s profitability, internal rate of return (IRR) and total 
profit were calculated considering Treviso´s side. IBAMA´s fees were also estimated and they 
will be compared with IBAMA´s expenditure with the entire ITTO project. 
  IRR was calculated considering all technical operations implemented by Treviso and 
supposing the highest prices of inputs and wages that would be paid in the region. By doing it, we 
overestimate the cost and, consequently, underestimate IRR. 
  Five different questionnaires were elaborated to inquire about job and income generation, 
improvement and profits generated by the reduced impact logging (RIL) techniques, and the 
occurrence of illegal exploitation of roundwood inside and surrounding Flona Tapajós. These 
questionnaires were applied to five different groups of actors involved directly with ITTO 
project: four village leaders, four ITTO project’s former workers, six local inhabitants not 
employed in the project but they would like to take part in other similar project, eight members of 
IBAMA local office and two Treviso´s owners. A total of 24 interviews were realized. It was not 
a random sample, because we selected intentionally key persons willing to collaborate with our 
research. 
  We repeated some common questions for different interviewed categories in order to be 
sure about the true reality. It was the case of questions related with working conditions and 
exploitation techniques used at ITTO project. 
 
5) Economic evaluation 
By using TREVISO´s information about operations applied at ITTO project (see 
Rodriguez and Bacha, 2004), we first estimate the average productivity for labor and machines 
for each main harvesting operation. After that, we use per unit costs for these resources to 
determine the specific per hectare total operation cost. Results are presented in Table 2. 
The mean volume extracted from the ITTO project was 20.25 m
3/ha of commercial logs. 
Considering the values presented in Table 2, and adding taxes, fees and freight (11.04 US$/m
3), 
the mean total production cost amounts to 30.26 US$/m
3. 
The internal rate of return was defined based on the following simplifying assumptions: 
(i)  logs were delivered to the sawmill grouped in four single loads, i.e., 38.46% of the total 
delivered in November 2000, 15.73% delivered in November 2001, 22.13% delivered in   8
November 2002, and 23.68% delivered in November 2003 (percent values reflect real 
production values on each one of the production phases); 
(ii)  each delivered load had the logs distributed in three quality classes accordingly to fixed 
amounts: 19.91% in class I; 37.51% in class II; and 42.59% in class III;  and 
(iii)  Logs were valued depending on its quality as follows: 83.33 US$/m
3 for logs in class I; 
41.67 US$/m
3 for logs in class II; and 20.83 US$/m
3 for logs in class III. 
 
Table 2: Average cost of reduced impact logging operations 
Activity task Productivity 
Cost 
US$/ha
Trail opening and area demarcation 
1  117.21 m/HH  3.45
100% inventory 
2  1.10 ha/h  12.31 Pre- 
Harvesting 
Liana control 
3  0.70 ha/HH  4.71
Roads and log landings construction 
4  591.82 m
2/HM 54.09
Skid trails planning 
5  1.52 trees/h  4.09
Felling 
6  1.43 trees/h  21.25
Harvesting 
Skidding 
7  2.93 trees/h  82.42
Data processing  -  1.33
Training  -  4.26
Mapping  -  4.02
Roads planning  -  0.81
Log landing operations  -  23.42
Support, logistics and supervision  -  4.92
Wages of permanent crews and equipment cost  -  55.83
Lodging  -  31.95
General 
Expenses 
Depreciation of tractors, vehicles and heavy machinery -  80.30
Partial cost  389.17
1 Average 2.68 men/crew opening 2,607.18 m/day (HH=human hour) 
2 Average 1.44 men/crew inventorying 1.10 ha/hour 
3 Average 2.31 men/crew controlling  11.12 ha/day 
4 Average 2.00 men/crew constructing 4,372.32 m
2/day (HM = machine hour) 
5 Average 3.16 men/crew marking 37.78 trees/day 
6 Average 7.28 men/crew, 3.39 crews/day felling 38.62 trees/day 
7 Skidder working an average of 8.06 h/day to move 23.47 trees/day 
 
Table 3 presents the resulting cash flow. The internal rate of return for the cash flow of 
the ITTO project was 35.79%, which is a very attractive rate and proves the project was very 
profitable. Moreover, ITTO project was more profitable than the highest profitable cattle project 
already conducted in the Amazon River Basin. Mattos and Uhl (1994) founded IRR ranging from   9
-2% to 12% for different cattle projects conducted in Eastern Amazon. Arima and Uhl (1997) 
found IRR ranging from 3% to 9% and Anualpec (2003) shows IRR ranging from 4% to 11% for 
Amazonian cattle projects. 
 
Table 3: Simplified cash flow  
Logs volume delivered in 
each quality class 
(m
3) 
I II  III 
Production (%) 














0  Nov/99  -      737,755.84   
1 Nov/00  38.46  4,854 9,145 10,381 301,739.45  1,001,817.68 
2 Nov/01  15.73  1,985 3,740 4,246 424,506.94 409,739.78 
3 Nov/02  22.13  2,793 5,262 5,973 454,239.69 576,448.91 
4 Nov/03  23.68  2,989 5,631 6,392 -  616,823.78 
1 Total production: 63,392 m
3 
2 Considering the total mean cost of delivered logs equals to 30.26 US$/m
3 
3 Considering values paid for each m
3 in each quality class indicated in the table 
 
Agropecuária Treviso Ltda sold logs extracted from the Tapajós National Forest 
exclusively to Cemex (Comercial Madeiras Exportação S.A. – Commercial Timber Exports). 
During the three first years of the project, Treviso was the unique responsible for all field 
operations. In 2002, Treviso  out-sourced the operations to Maflops ( Manejo Florestal e 
Prestação de Serviços –  Forest Management and Services). A specific price was paid by 
Cemex/Treviso to Maflops for the services. Cemex/Treviso also assumed the payment of all taxes 
and fees to IBAMA and freight costs.  
According to representatives of Cemex/Treviso and Maflops, the values paid for the 
services supplied by Maflops were the ones presented in Table 4. The average of the values paid 
on the last two years were very close to the estimated average of total cost (30.26 US$/m3) 
calculated by Rodriguez and Bacha (2004) for the roundwood extracted from the ITTO project in 






The governmental agency involved (IBAMA) obtained direct returns, in the form of cash, 
from the fees it charged. Concession fees were charged accordingly to three classes of trees. Log 
production volume ended up distributed among these three classes as follows: 19.91% in class I, 
37.51% in class II, and 42.58% in class III. Considering average fee values of US$ 4.14/m
3, US$ 
2.48/m
3 and US$ 1.145/m
3, for classes I, II and III, respectively. ITTO project would generate 
US$ 150,465 on fees to IBAMA. However, this Federal agency was not efficient to charge those 
fees. 
Fees and taxes paid by the concessionaire (estimated in some 298 thousand dollars) 
represent close to 20% of the amount that IBAMA was supposed to allocate for the project. It is 
not unsatisfactory, because IBAMA would have the same expenditure whether or not the ITTO 
project took place. No direct benefits from 298 thousand IBAMA´s revenues were actually 
internalized by the local IBAMA office in Santarém and by the communities in the National 
Forest. 
Therefore, the ITTO project ended up reasonably profitable to the concessionaire, but at 
the same time quite expensive given the small amount of direct benefits really captured by all 
other stake holders in the area, especially IBAMA and the local communities. 
 
6) SOCIAL IMPACTS OF REDUCED IMPACT LOGGING 
Brazilian Federal government establishes a unique minimum salary for all national 
territory and its real value has being increased during the last ten years. Moreover, Brazil’s 
working rights guarantee a 44-hour maximum weekly working time period and each extra hour 
need to be paid 50% higher. Workers have the right of a 30-day paid vacation per year and one 
extra wage per year (called 13
th wage). Employers pay several taxes, differing according to its 
activity. They add up something ranging from 49% to 102% of the payroll, depending on the 
economic activity. 
Table 4: Values paid for the logs transported to the Cemex sawmill 
Year 
Paid to Maflops 












2002 10.83  4.00  6.67 21.50 
2003 15.00  5.00  8.67 28.67 
2004 20.83  6.00  9.17 36.00 
Exchange rate: 3.00 R$/US$   11
These huge working taxes paid by employers and actual high unemployment rates 
motivate employers to hire illegal workers, paying less than a minimum wage and not paying 
working rights, such as retirement fees, for example.  
Interviews with local stakeholders, from May 27
th to June 2
nd 2004, and the analysis of 
documents provided by Treviso and Cemex produced information about jobs, paid wages and 
destiny of income, working conditions, non-monetary benefits and negative impacts of ITTO 
project. In the following pages, we condensed our findings, having as background the Brazilian 
working rights (explained in the former two paragraphs). 
 
6.1) Amount and quality of jobs generated 
From the interviews, the following were diagnosed: 
a.  The ITTO project employed from 42 to 51 workers per month, an average of one job for 
each group of 17 families living in the Tapajós National Forest; 
b.  There were 43 jobs offered during the last year of the project: one forest engineer, one 
forest technician, one accountant, three loader operators, one tractor operator, two skidder 
operators, one cook, one cooking assistant, one mechanic, one tire fitter, eight chainsaw 
operators, eight chainsaw assistants, four skidding planners and assistants, eight log landing 
inventory keepers, and two security guards; 
c.  At the beginning, all hired workers were non-local residents, but at the end of ITTO project 
approximately 60% were workers hired from the local Flona Tapajós communities; 
d.  Local workforce occupied low and medium qualified positions, such as chainsaw operation, 
cooking, tree identification, mechanics, log landing accounting and other supporting roles; 
e.  Most of the local workers that joined to the ITTO project lived in the communities crossed 
by the dirt roads easily driven on non-rainy seasons (São Domingos, Maguari, Acaratinga, 
Pedreira, São Jorge, Santa Clara, Nossa Senhora do Nazaré e Nova Vida), creating a bias 
against all other communities; 
f.  Due to the difficulty of access to certain communities, no worker was hired from 
neighboring communities to the ITTO project (such as Piquiatuba, Marituba e Marai); 
g.  At the beginning, job stability was low and, from the 50 initially hired workers, only 17 
workers were kept as crew members on the second year.   12
The above features were in accordance with the ITTO project intention, because local 
communities were involved in the project in conformity with their abilities. Unequal involvement 
of all forest communities reflects their different abilities and organization. 
 
6.2) Wages and working rights 
The wage officially paid was one minimum salary for less qualified workers and two 
minimum salaries to the mechanics, although most of them ended up receiving a little more due 
to extra hours worked. It is important to say, that, all workers hired by Treviso were legally hired. 
It is not common in western part of Pará, where illegally hired workers have ranged from 47.5% 
to 62.1% of total workforce (Sant´ana, 2005). 
There were a few periods when payments had to be delayed, but all interviewers affirmed 
that Treviso honored all contractual working clauses. 
A three category wage policy was established by Treviso to accommodate a basic wage 
level, paid during the first 90 days of experience to the worker, a second category of wages were 
paid after the experience period, and the third category of wages were paid for workers with 
training courses. From the first to third category was approximately 50% increase on salary for 
the same job. 
Comparing the above situation with other local workers employed in other activities, we 
can affirm that Treviso´s workers were among the best paid workers surrounding Flona Tapajós 
area. 
 
6.3) Working conditions 
Evaluating the working conditions faced by field workers at ITTO project, the following 
can be affirmed: 
a.  Reasonably adequate lodging facilities were built by Treviso in the working area; 
b.  Food was prepared by one cook and one assistant to offer all daily meals by the workforce; 
c.  Extended working periods were very common, with workers taking twelve straight days 
followed by two resting days (usually a Saturday and a Sunday), or even 25 running days 
followed by five resting days – although Sunday afternoons were always reserved to rest on 
any of these two systems;   13
d.  All hours beyond the regular and daily eight hours of work were considered extra hours 
and, according to the interviews, they were paid by Treviso; 
e.  Workers don’t have any complaint regarding lodging, food and working journeys. 
The above situation reinforces our conclusion that ITTO project workers were adequately 
paid and best possible working conditions in the area surrounding the project were offered to 
ITTO project workers. 
 
6.4) Destiny of wages paid to the ITTO workers 
Most of the interviewed workers said their welfare increased while working for the ITTO 
project and that their earnings were used to buy durable products (like ovens, bicycles, beds and 
wardrobe, for example), and non-durable consuming items such as clothes, shoes and food. 
According to our interviews and local visits, the project did not alter the local level of 
investment, except in two cases where a small meat business and an “eco-leather” craft 
manufacture (producing wallets, purses, backpacks etc., made out from rubber and latex) were 
established by two former workers of ITTO project.  
However, all interviewed ex-workers declared they would like to take again a job in 
similar logging operations inside the National Forest. Other interviewed local workers, with no 
past experience in the ITTO project, declared they would like to take a job in logging operations 
inside the National Forest because they perceived improvements in the welfare of those that did 
get involved with the ITTO project. 
 
6.5) Non-monetary benefits produced by the ITTO project 
All interviewed ITTO project ex-workers guarantee they learned new skills, specially 
reduced impact logging techniques. Some of them considered they learned a new profession, such 
as tree identifiers, felling and skidding planners, and loading site inventory controllers; 
Treviso widened and improved local dirt roads that connect the BR163 highway with the 
Pedreira and Piquiatuba communities, what surrounding ITTO project area.  
   14
6.6) ITTO project negative direct  impact 
The Piquiatuba community, closest community to the ITTO project area, points out to 
diminishing hunting opportunities (jaguars, dears and tapirs, for example) as one of the main 
problems introduced by the logging operations. However, it could not be checked. Most of 




The reduced impact logging project coordinated by IBAMA, and co-funded by 
DFID/ITTO, in the Tapajos National Forest – the ITTO project – turned out to be a profitable 
operation for the concessionaire (Treviso), allowing it to comply with all working legal 
obligations. That contributed to the general welfare for all workers living in the Flona Tapajós 
communities who worked in the ITTO project. 
Most part of favorable perceptions of the opportunities created by the ITTO project were 
due to good local job opportunities are actually almost inexistent. 
Although ITTO project was tiny in relation to all Brazilian native forests, it proved 
reduced impact logging (RIL) can be applied inside and outside national forests and show forests 
do not need to be destroyed in order to generate jobs and income. Moreover, ITTO project shows 
itself more profitable than cattle projects. 
Reduced impact logging projects in other Brazilian National Forests, to really involve the 
local communities as forest keepers, must in the future include mechanisms to transfer direct and 
indirect benefits to these local populations, such as (i) continuing training programs, and (ii) 
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